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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered by the Third Judicial District 
Court, Honorable Michael K. Burton presiding, against plaintiff/ appellant Albert 
Sandberg and in favor of defendant / appellee Lehman Jensen & Donahue. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case presents the following issues for review: 
1. Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment on the ground that the 
Governmental Immunity Act barred Sandberg's claims against Salt Lake City? The trial 
court's grant of summary judgment is an issue of law, which is reviewed for correctness. 
Taylor v. Qgden Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996). 
2. Did the trial court properly apply the Governmental Immunity Act as it 
existed between 1996 and 1999 when the alleged negligence occurred notwithstanding 
subsequently developed law concerning Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution? A 
trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Id 
3. May the trial court's grant of summary judgment be affirmed on the ground 
that the City had no duty to remove water or ice from the sidewalk, which Sandberg 
claims was the cause of his fall? Although the trial court did not rule on this issue, this 
Court "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial 
court, even if it is one not relied on below." Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 
235 (Utah 1993). The question of whether a duty exists is an issue of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 
1998). 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is barred.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a legal malpractice action brought by plaintiff Albert Sandberg 
against defendant Lehman, Jensen & Donahue, the law firm of Sandberg5s former 
attorney, the late Gordon Jensen. (R. 1-2). Mr. Jensen represented Sandberg in an action 
to recover for injuries Sandberg sustained when he slipped and fell at the Salt Lake 
Valley Solid Waste Facility in Salt Lake City (the "Waste Facility"). (R. 2). That action 
was filed against Salt Lake County (the "County"), which paid Sandberg $100,000 in 
settlement. (R. 3) In this legal malpractice action, Sandberg claims that Gordon Jensen 
was negligent in not naming Salt Lake City (the "City") as an additional defendant in that 
lawsuit, and that if the City had been named he would have recovered more than the 
$100,000 he has received. (R. 3-4). 
Sandberg initially filed his complaint on November 2, 2000 (R. 1). Lehman, 
Jensen & Donahue answered on November 21, 2000 (R. 10). After conducting 
discovery, Lehman, Jensen & Donahue moved for summary judgment on November 21, 
2001, arguing that Sandberg could not prove that he would have prevailed in a lawsuit 
against the City, had one been filed. (R. 143) In particular, Lehman, Jensen & Donahue 
raised two primary defenses to the City's liability. First, the City was immune from 
liability because the design of the Waste Facility was a discretionary governmental 
function under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Second, even if the Governmental 
2 
Immunity Act did not apply, the City still could not be held liable because the City did 
not have a duty to prevent Sandberg from slipping. (R. 143-59). 
Sandberg filed his Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment on December 11, 2001. (R. 905). In his opposition papers, Sandberg argued 
that the discretionary function exception did not apply because: (1) the City's decisions 
were not essential to the realization of a governmental policy; and (2) the City's decisions 
were not evaluated at an immunized policy-making level. (R. 905-14). In addition, 
Sandberg argued that application of the Governmental Immunity Act to Sandberg's claim 
would violate the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution. (R. 914-917). Finally, 
Sandberg argued that the City owed a duty of care to remove the ice on the landfill 
sidewalk which caused Sandberg's fall. (R. 917-21). 
The trial court held a hearing on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on January 10, 2002. (R. 1083 ). After considering the parties' memoranda, supporting 
affidavits, and substantial documentary evidence in the record, the trial court granted 
Lehman, Jensen, & Donahue's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the 
City was immune from liability under the discretionary function exception of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. In addition, the court further held that the Governmental 
Immunity Act was constitutional as it applied to Sandberg's claim. (R. 1083, p. 66). The 
trial court's order dismissing Sandberg's claim was entered on January 22, 2002, after 
which Sandberg filed his notice of appeal. (R. 1072 -77). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Sandberg's Personal Injury Claim. 
Plaintiff Albert Sandberg was injured when he slipped and fell at the Salt Lake 
Valley Solid Waste Facility (the "Waste Facility") on March 25, 1996. (R. 1-2). Prior to 
his accident, Sandberg had been to the Waste Facility on several occasions and was 
familiar with the design and layout of the landfill. He was also well aware of the need to 
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exercise caution in unloading debris. Sandberg knew that the landfill had a fairly steep 
pit, and even recalls seeing a painted sign warning "Caution, Five Feet Deep." (R. 140, 
842-44). More importantly, Sandberg knew that there was a particular need to exercise 
caution that day, as there had been precipitation the night before. Id. 
On the day of the accident, Sandberg arrived at the landfill at about 11:00 a.m., 
backed up his truck about a foot away from the curb, and began unloading debris into the 
landfill. Sandberg noticed that there was "[v]ery little room" between the tailgate of his 
truck and the open pit, however, he stepped up into the bed of the truck anyway and 
grabbed a piece of wood with wires attached to it. Id. While holding the piece of wood, 
Sandberg stepped down out of the bed with one foot, slipped on the wet concrete, and fell 
backward into the pit. (R. 141; 845-46). Sandberg claims that slipping on the wet 
sidewalks caused his fall and that a chain or barrier across the landfill's pit could have 
prevented his accident. (R. 141; 846-47). 
Sandberg retained Gordon Jensen and the law firm of Lehman, Jensen & Donahue 
to represent him in connection with his personal injury claim. Mr. Jensen filed an action 
against the County, but unfortunately he passed away before Sandberg's claim was 
resolved. After Gordon Jensen's death, Sandberg retained Anderson & Karrenberg to 
represent him in his action against the County. Sandberg's new counsel also filed a 
notice of claim against the City, which was denied as untimely. However, Anderson & 
Karrenberg was successful in settling Sandberg's settled his claim against the County for 
$100,000. (R. 3). 
B. Sandberg's Legal Malpractice Action. 
After settling his dispute with the County, Sandberg filed this legal malpractice 
action against defendant Lehman, Jensen & Donahue on November 2, 2000, alleging that 
the law firm had negligently represented him in the personal injury action. (R. 1-2). In 
particular, Sandberg alleged that Gordon Jensen was negligent in not naming Salt Lake 
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City as a defendant in his personal injury lawsuit as well. Sandberg contends that if the 
City had been named he would have recovered more than the $100,000 he has received 
from the County. (R. 3-4). 
Because Sandberg's suit was one for legal malpractice, Sandberg was required to 
prove that he would have prevailed in a lawsuit against the City had one been filed. (R. 
143). In an effort to prove that "suit within a suit," Sandberg argued that the City 
negligently designed the Waste Facility by having a five foot deep pit, a sidewalk that put 
patrons too close to the pit while unloading, and the absence of barriers or chains across 
the pit. In its defense, Lehman, Jensen & Donahue argued that Sandberg would not have 
prevailed in an action against the City, because the design of the landfill was a 
discretionary function under the Governmental Immunity Act. (R. 143-159). 
C. The City's Design of the Waste Facility. 
The development of the Waste Facility was a lengthy process that began in August 
of 1980, when the City and the County entered into an Interlocal Cooperation Agreement 
and formed the Salt Lake Valley Solid Waste Management Council (the "Council"). (R. 
128; 162; 164). Among other things, the Interlocal Cooperation Agreement grants the 
Council the authority to adopt rules and regulations "to advance, enhance, foster and 
promote safe and efficient solid waste disposal" Id. Pursuant to the agreement, the City 
and the County conducted extensive studies regarding the design, development, and 
construction of the Waste Facility. For example, in August of 1989, City Engineers hired 
consultants Chen-Northern, Inc. to prepare a Report of Geotechnical Investigation 
regarding groundwater levels and surface drainage. (R. 129; 172). In addition, the Salt 
Lake County Public Works Department, Solid Waste Disposal Division ("Public Works 
Department") studied the need for a new facility by evaluating the number of commercial 
and private vehicles utilizing then-existing landfills. (R. 129; 195). 
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Two separate consulting firms were hired to assist the City and County in 
assessing the need for a citizen's unloading station and developing an appropriate design 
for the unloading station. (R. 130, 195). The first consultant, James M. Montgomery 
("Montgomery") of Consulting Engineers Inc., issued a report to the Salt Lake 
City/County Landfill Council in November of 1998 (the "Montgomery Report"). Id. 
Among other things, the Montgomery Report recommended that management evaluate 
the construction of its transfer facilities and modify the disposal operations to reduce 
private citizen traffic at the face of the landfill. (R. 130; 222-23). The Montgomery 
Report also concluded that a transfer station could improve accessibility and reduce the 
potential for personal injury among private citizens using the then-existing landfill. (R. 
130-31; 244-46). In addition, the Montgomery conducted a cost/benefit analysis and 
found that implementing a transfer station to serve private citizens could potentially 
improve public safety and financial savings. (R. 131; 256). 
The City and County hired a second consulting firm, Brown, Vence and 
Associates, which issued its report to the Public Works Department on March 2, 1990 
(the "BVA Report"). (R. 131; 308). The BVA Report assessed various resource 
recovery alternatives for the Salt Lake area and concluded that a citizen transfer station 
would allow individuals to dump their waste loads at a safe and convenient location and 
avoid safety risks associated with exposure to the tipping face, large commercial trucks 
and landfill vehicles. (R. 131-32; 425-26). The BVA Report also contained extensive 
analysis of the citizen transfer station alternative, evaluating such factors as waste 
reduction potential, environmental impacts, capital cost, cost effectiveness, and ease of 
implementation. (R. 132; 530). 
The Public Works Department reviewed both the Montgomery Report and the 
BVA Report, and analyzed the consultants' recommendations against industry health and 
safety standards such as the Sanitary Landfill Manual of Practice prepared by the 
American Society of Civil Engineers. (R. 130; 195-96). After reviewing these 
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authorities, the Public Works Department formally proposed a citizen's unloading station 
at the landfill on March 22, 1990. A citizen's unloading station (or transfer station) 
consists of a central disposal area where citizens unload their garbage and debris, which 
later is be moved by heavy equipment to a landfill area. In its report, the Public Works 
Department stated that the Solid Waste Disposal Division and the Council agreed with 
the consultants' recommendation to construct such a facility. (R. 132; 195). 
The Public Works Department's proposal identified several benefits of a smaller 
disposal face, such as improved safety, lower risk of fire, less blowing litter, and less 
potential for leachate generation. (R. 133; 196). The Public Works Department's 
proposal also noted that the landfill's construction and design were compatible with 
current local and national recycling trends. Id. Finally, the Public Works Department's 
proposal addressed the budget impacts of construction and identified five construction 
bids for the job ranging between $762,792.85 and $984,000. Id Based on the above-
mentioned considerations, the Public Works Department and the Council proposed an 
implementation plan to design, construct, and operate the citizens' unloading facility. Id. 
The Salt Lake City Corporation Engineering Division ("City Engineering") was 
hired to design the citizen's unloading station. Id. City Engineering drafted a document 
outlining the Scope of Work, which recommended that the "proposed design concept 
consist[] of a central pit located approximately in the center of the parcel with access 
roads on both sides for autos and private trailers." (R. 134; 585). The Scope of Work 
contained an artist's rendition of what the overall landfill would look like, including a pit 
without barriers. (R. 134; 586; 593). 
Paul Jara, a civil engineer with over twenty years of experience, was the city 
engineer in charge of design. Mr. Jara had worked for Salt Lake City from 1979 to 1998 
when he retired. Mr. Jara reported to the engineering administrator. The engineering 
administrator reports to the public works director who in turn reports to the mayor. (R. 
134; 596-98). 
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In preparing the Waste Facility's design, Mr. Jara researched various landfill 
designs throughout the country. Mr. Jara even personally visited some of the landfills, 
including the Lovelace Transfer Station in Stockton California, three transfer stations in 
Northern California and one in Portland, Oregon to compare designs. (R. 134; 603-04). 
In his research, Mr. Jara also reviewed plans of the Lovelace landfill in California (which 
utilized a pit in its design), along with an independent consulting firm's review of that 
facility's plans. Significantly, there were no barriers such as chains or poles around the 
pit in the Lovelace landfill. (R. 135; 603-04). Mr. Jara performed substantial research 
and calculations in the design of the landfill regarding the materials used, the design of 
the pit walls and floor, and other building and safety issues. Mr. Jara's research was 
based on accepted industry standards such as Uniform Building Codes, the American 
Association of State Highway Officials classification of soils, and data from the 
American Concrete Institute. All of Mr. Jara's research and analysis was included in his 
Design Report. (R. 135; 632). 
In August of 1990, the City entered into an engineering consulting contract with 
EMCON Associates, a California consulting company in Waste Management and 
Environmental Control. The contract provided that EMCON would review the design of 
the proposed unloading facility, and prepare a letter report and sketches it needed 
providing its comments and recommendations on design. In particular, EMCON agreed 
to review the design concept, traffic patterns, safety features, and debris control measures 
incorporated in the design. (R. 135; 770). 
EMCON issued a report of its findings on August 8, 1990. (R. 136; 786). 
EMCON believed that the design of the citizens unloading facility with a pit without 
barriers is within industry standards and is a safe design. (R. 136; 792). Based on its 
knowledge of the industry, EMCON noted that several landfills in the United States that 
have pits at citizen unloading facilities. Some of those facilities have barriers such as 
chains or poles around the pit and some do not have barriers. (R. 136; 791). In 
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evaluating the Waste Facility's design, EMCON did not identify safety concerns that 
were inconsistent with other facilities throughout the United States. Id. 
EMCON also believed that barriers such as chains or poles around the pit may 
cause problems as such barriers interfere with citizens unloading refuse into the pit. 
Also, barriers such as chains or poles present safety concerns because they can cause a 
more serious injury than if the barriers were not in place. Id. Although EMCON did not 
recommend that barriers be installed around the pit at the citizen's unloading facility, it 
did suggest other safety precautions such as wheel stops. IdL The City incorporated 
EMCON's comments in its design. (R. 136; 794). 
At various stages in the design process, the City sent copies of the plans to public 
and private entities for their consideration and comment. For instance, when the plans 
were 40%, 70% and 100% complete, the City sent the plans to such entities as Planning 
& Zoning, the Public Utilities Department, Streets, Transportation, Parks, Cable TV of 
Utah, Mountain Fuel Supply Company, Utah Power & Light Company, U.S. West 
Communications and AT&T. (R. 137; 796-818). Many of the public and private entities 
who reviewed the plans sent their comments to the City regarding changes to the plans or 
considerations that the City needed to take in account. (R. 137; 823-31). 
The Public Works Department and the Council also met with City Engineering 
and Paul Jara regarding the plans. (R. 137; 196). City Engineering recommended the use 
of a pit at the citizens unloading facility. After reviewing City Engineering's research 
and meeting with Mr. Jara, the Council agreed with the recommendation to use a pit. (R. 
138; 197). 
The Public Works Department and the Council also conducted review meetings at 
various points of design and construction. Id. At these meetings, all aspects of the 
design process, including whether to install additional safety features around the pit such 
as barriers like chains or poles were discussed, and the decision was made not to install 
chains or poles. IdL; see also R. 599. 
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The Public Works Department and the Council sought the recommendation of 
City Engineering on the issue of whether to install additional safety features around the 
pit. One of the safety options considered and rejected was the use of chains or barriers 
around the pit. In response to a request for a recommendation, City Engineering opposed 
the installation of barriers around the pit because it interfered with the unloading of refuse 
into the pit and created a hazard for the person unloading the refuse because it could 
cause a more serious accident than if the restraint was not there. (R. 136; 197; 599-601). 
The Public Works Department and the Council agreed with City Engineering's 
recommendation and approved the City's plans to construct a pit without barriers. (R. 
136; 197). 
Based upon the substantial evidence in the record suggesting that the City and its 
agents had weighed a variety of policy decisions in designing the landfill, the trial court 
concluded that the City would have been entitled to discretionary function immunity. (R. 
1083, p.66). As such, Sandberg was unable to prove his "suit within a suit," and 
summary judgment was granted in favor of Lehman, Jensen & Donahue. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On January 10, 2002, the trial court granted Lehman, Jensen & Donohue's motion 
for summary judgment, concluding that Sandberg could not establish the legal 
malpractice element of proximate cause as a matter of law. The trial court recognized 
that 
[t]o prove proximate cause in legal malpractice cases . . . , the 
plaintiff must show that absent the attorney's negligence, the 
underlying suit would have been successful. Thus, the 
proximate cause issue is ordinarily handled by means of a 
"suit within a suit" or "trial-within-a-trial." 
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439-40 (Utah 1996); see also Swift Stop, Inc. v. 
Wight, 845 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). To meet this proximate cause standard, 
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Sandberg was required to prove that he would have prevailed in a lawsuit against the City 
had one been filed. 
In an effort to prove that "suit within a suit," Sandberg argued that the City 
negligently designed the Waste Facility by having a five foot deep pit, a sidewalk that put 
patrons too close to the pit while unloading, and the absence of barriers or chains across 
the pit. He also argued that the cause of his fall was slipping on the wet sidewalk. Even 
when viewing these facts in light most favorable to Sandberg, the trial court correctly 
found that the City was not and could not have been liable as a matter of law. This is 
because the design of the Waste Facility - which included the pit, the sidewalk, and the 
absence of any chain or barrier - is a discretionary governmental function and therefore 
protected by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §60-30-10. 
On appeal, Sandberg contends, first, that the design of the Waste Facility was not 
really a discretionary governmental function, and thus the trial court erred in holding that 
any action against the City would have been barred by governmental immunity. Second, 
Sandberg argues that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is unconstitutional because it 
abrogates a claim Sandberg would have had at common law, and thus violates the open 
courts provision of the Utah Constitution. Since Sandberg filed his appellate brief, the 
Utah Supreme Court has issued an opinion in Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79 
(August 9, 2002), which held "that the 1987 amendment [to the Governmental Immunity 
Act] is unconstitutional as it applies to municipalities operating electrical power 
systems." Id. at f71. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's summary judgment ruling, 
notwithstanding Sandberg's arguments and the Laney decision, for four reasons. First, 
while Laney is a case in which the supreme court declared unconstitutional the 
Governmental Immunity Act that served as the basis for the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling, Laney does not apply here for a very good reason. Within the context of 
a legal malpractice action, whether or not the lawyer was negligent is determined by the 
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law that exists at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. At the time Lehman, Jensen & 
Donohue failed to sue the City, Laney had not been issued and the Governmental 
Immunity Act was the governing law. The conduct of Lehman, Jensen & Donohue must 
be judged under that Act before it was declared unconstitutional. 
Second, under the Governmental Immunity Act as it existed at the time of the 
alleged legal malpractice, any claim against the City should have been barred by the 
discretionary governmental function analysis. Indeed, before Laney, the Utah appellate 
courts applied the discretionary governmental function analysis in multiple cases, so the 
trial court reasonably concluded that the Governmental Immunity Act should have 
applied to bar a claim against the City if it had been raised. 
Third, even if the Governmental Immunity Act had been unconstitutional before 
Laney, as Sandberg contends, Sandberg would not have had a claim against the City 
under the law that existed before the Governmental Immunity Act was amended in 1987. 
The Governmental Immunity Act did not abrogate an existing remedy, because under the 
common law operation of a City landfill is a core governmental function. Consequently, 
even under the Laney analysis, the 1987 amendment did not abrogate any claim Sandberg 
previously possessed. 
Fourth, this Court can and should affirm summary judgment on the alternative 
ground that the City did not have or breach a duty to Sandberg as a matter of law. 
Sandberg claims that the cause of his fall was the accumulation of ice or water on the 
sidewalk. As a matter of law, however, a landowner does not have an obligation to clear 
walkways of ice or water. The City, therefore, could not have caused Sandberg's 
accident. 
For these reasons, explained more fully below, Sandberg could not have prevailed 
in a claim against the City as a matter of law. Consequently, the trial court correctly 
concluded that he cannot prevail in his legal malpractice action as a matter of law. 
Summary judgment, therefore, should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. The Law Existing At the Time of the Alleged Malpractice Governs. 
On August 9, 2002, after Sandberg had filed his opening appeal brief, the Utah 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Laney, holding that "the 1987 amendment [to the 
Governmental Immunity Act] is unconstitutional as it applies to municipalities operating 
electrical power systems." 2002 UT 79 at f71. Even though Laney was limited to the 
specific facts of that case, and is distinguishable for the reasons set forth in subsection C, 
below, it is essential to point out that any reliance on Laney in this case is misplaced. 
The question of governmental immunity arises here in the context of a legal malpractice 
"suit within a suit" analysis. Laney does not apply in this context because it was not the 
law in existence at the time of Lehman, Jensen & Donohue's alleged negligence in failing 
to file suit against the City. See Hipwell v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987 (Utah 1993). 
Hipwell was a legal malpractice case in which Shelly Hipwell, through her 
guardian, hired attorneys Sharp and Healy (collectively "Sharp") to represent her in 
connection with a claim against the University of Utah Medical Center (the "University 
Hospital") for negligently causing severe brain damage and permanent disability. Sharp 
advised Hipwell to enter into a settlement agreement with the University Hospital rather 
than file suit. The settlement was for $250,000, which Sharp advised was the statutory 
maximum Hipwell could receive against the University Hospital under Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34(1). IdL at 988. Apparently 
unbeknownst to Sharp, six days before he advised his client to settle rather than sue, the 
Utah Supreme Court had issued its opinion in Condemarian v. University Hospital 775 
P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), declaring "the $250,000 damage recovery limit (the 'cap') in the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the 'Act') was unconstitutional as applied to the 
Hospital" because it violated the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. 858 
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P.2d at 988. When Hipwell learned of Condemarian, she sued Sharp for negligence, 
claiming she would have sued the University Hospital and recovered more than the 
$250,000 settlement if Sharp had advised her of the Condemarian ruling. 
In the legal malpractice case, Sharp moved for summary judgment, asking the 
court "to rule that Condemarian's holding as to the Hospital's liability is incorrect and 
then retroactively apply a decision addressing Condemarian to protect them from a 
negligence claim arising from [his] representation of Hipwell in 1989." Id. The trial 
court denied that motion and the supreme court affirmed, holding that "[i]t is well settled 
that an evaluation of the reasonableness of an attorney's services must be based on the 
law as it existed at the time such services were rendered, not after a subsequent legal 
malpractice action is filed." Id. at 989. Thus, even though the law voiding the $250,000 
cap was only six days old at the time of Sharp's alleged negligence, that law nonetheless 
applied regardless of whether Condemarian was overruled after the legal malpractice 
action was filed. 
In the context of a legal malpractice action, applying the law that existed at the 
time of the alleged negligence makes perfect sense. As explained by one commentator: 
Errors of law typically are revealed by the benefit of 
hindsight and the "correct" answer was not often reasonably 
apparent to the attorney at the time of the conduct or advice. 
Refinement of law through judicial repetition, resolution, or 
analysis may illuminate legal problems, the answer to which 
at one time seemed, at best, fortuitous. Fortunately, the 
standard of care is not established by hindsight, but by the 
skills, knowledge and diligence that were appropriate at the 
time of the alleged act or omission . . . . 
3 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice, §19.10 (5th ed. 2000). 
Under the Hipwell analysis, the trial court in this case was obligated to apply the 
law that existed at the time the allegedly defective legal services were rendered, not the 
law that has developed after the legal malpractice action was filed. In review, this Court 
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also is obligated to apply the law that existed in 2000 when the alleged negligence of 
Lehman, Jensen & Donohue occurred, not the Laney decision that was rendered on 
August 9, 2002. As described in the following subsection, under the law that existed in 
2000, any claim Sandberg might have made against the City would have been barred by 
the discretionary governmental function doctrine. Under of the unique circumstance in 
which the governmental immunity issue is raised here - i.e., as the "suit within a suit" in 
a legal malpractice case - the Laney decision simply does not apply. 
B. Sandberg's Claims Against the City Are Barred By Governmental 
Immunity. 
The trial court correctly concluded that between 1996 and 1999 when Lehman, 
Jensen & Donohue represented Sandberg, Sandberg's claims that the Waste Facility was 
negligently designed were barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-1 et seq. Under the governing law at the time, "[t]o determine whether a 
governmental entity is immune from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
(the Act), three questions must be answered: (1) Was the activity undertaken by the entity 
a governmental function and therefore immunized from suit? . . (2) [H]as another 
section of the Act waived that blanket immunity? (3) [D]oes the Act contain an 
exception to that waiver resulting in a retention of immunity against the claim asserted?" 
Keegan v. Utah, 896 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 1995). For purposes of the summary judgment 
motion, and on this appeal, the parties have assumed that the Waste Facility fits the 
definition of a governmental function and that blanket immunity had been waived. Thus, 
the issue before the trial court and this Court is whether the discretionary function 
exception to waiver applies. 
Section 63-30-10 of the Governmental Immunity Act contains the discretionary 
function exception, and provides that "[i]mmunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused" in "the exercise or performance or the failure to 
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exercise or perform a discretionary function . . . ." Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(a). The 
purpose of discretionary function immunity is "to shield those governmental acts and 
decisions impacting on large numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseen ways from 
individual and class legal actions, the continual threat of which would make public 
administration all but impossible." Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623 (quoting Hansen v. Salt 
Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990)). The discretionary function exception 
pertains "to those decisions and acts occurring at the basic policy-making level, and not. 
. . to those acts and decisions taking place at the operational level which concern routine, 
everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of broad policy factors." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized a four-part test to determine if a decision 
or act qualifies for a discretionary function exception: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission or decision necessarily involve a 
basic governmental policy, program or objective? 
(2) Is the act, omission or decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program or objective as opposed to 
one which would not change the course or direction of the policy, 
program or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission or decision require the exercise of basic 
policy evaluation, judgment and expertise on the part of the 
governmental agency involved? 
(4) Does the agency involved possess the requisite constitutional, 
statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged 
act, omission or decision? 
Id. at 624. As set forth below, the trial court properly held that all four of these 
requirements are satisfied in this case. 
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1. The Design of the Waste Facility Necessarily Involves a Basic 
Governmental Policy, Program or Objective. 
The design of the Waste Facility, including a centrally located pit surrounded by 
concrete sidewalks and without barriers or chains, necessarily involved a basic 
governmental policy, program, or objective. That basic governmental policy is the 
disposition of public waste in a safe, environmentally sensitive manner that is convenient 
for citizens. This was spelled out, among other places, in the Interlocal Cooperation 
Agreement, which gave the Council the authority and responsibility to provide solid 
waste management and disposal services to the citizens of the County and City. The 
Council was charged with the power and duty "to advance, enhance, foster and promote 
safe and efficient solid waste disposal for the conduct of the business of and the use and 
operation of any solid waste processing and disposal facilities thereof." (R. 164). The 
Council also was obligated to "plan, establish, and approve all construction and 
expansion projects for solid waste processing and disposal operations." (R. 165). Thus, 
the design of the Waste Facility involved basic governmental policy making. 
2. The Design of the Waste Facility was Essential to the Realization or 
Accomplishment of a Governmental Policy, Program and Objective. 
The design of the Waste Facility was also essential to the accomplishment of the 
governmental purpose of designing and constructing a landfill, and is consistent with 
Interlocal Cooperation Agreement's objective of disposing of waste in a safe and 
convenient matter. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the objective could have been 
accomplished at all without the design and without taking into account the safety 
considerations inherent in the design in light of the budgetary constraints. 
In fact, the first paragraph of the Proposal for the Citizens Unloading Station 
reads: 
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With the tremendous amount of attention given to environmental concerns, 
it is more necessary than ever that the solid waste disposal techniques 
employed by the Salt Lake Valley landfill be as advanced as possible. 
(R. 203). Furthermore, the design of the pit itself involved this same basic governmental 
policy, program or objective. As set forth in the Design Report of Paul Jara: 
This project is a joint effort by Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City. 
County Commissioner Tom Shimizu says citizens are getting three benefits 
for the price of one. "This project does it all! It increases safety at the 
landfill, helps keep mud off your shoes and will extend the life of our 
landfill." 
The proposed design concept consists of a central pit located approximately 
in the center of the parcel with access roads on both sides for autos and 
private trailers. 
(R. 632). 
Although Sandberg's Notice of Claim against the City challenged the design and 
maintenance of the landfill (R. 1031-32), once he was faced with a governmental 
immunity argument, Sandberg attempted to redefine the issue in an improper and 
restrictively narrow way. He now ignores the fact that the open-face design of the pit 
without chains or barriers and the width of the sidewalk are two of thousands of specific 
features of the overall design. Rather, he now claims that the "act, omission, or decision" 
at issue in the present case is not simply the act of designing the Facility; but instead the 
City's failure to add a safety chain or widen the sidewalk after construction. Appellant's 
Brief at 20. Sandberg's overly narrow characterization of the City's decision is 
inappropriate in at least two ways. 
First, under Utah law, the distinction between governmental decisions that fall 
within the discretionary function exception and those that do not is not based on how 
narrowly or broadly the issue is defined, as Sandberg suggests. Rather, it is based on the 
nature of the governmental decision. In Keegan v. Utah, 896 P.2d 618, 621, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that the discretionary function exception "should be confined to 
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those decisions and acts occurring at the basic policy-making level, and not extended to 
those acts and decisions taking place at the operational level which concern routine, 
everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of broad policy factors." (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the question for this court is whether the Landfill design (as defendants define it) or 
the absence of chains and narrow sidewalks (as Sandberg defines it) is a basic policy 
making decision or a day-to-day operational decision. The safety aspects of the design -
whether it is open-face, narrow sidewalks, chains, wide sidewalks, padding at the bottom 
of the pit, or other restraints to prevent falling - is still part of the design. As part of the 
design, it is part of the policy making function. 
Although inapplicable for the reasons described herein, Laney v. Fairview City, 
2002 UT 79,1ff[l7-l9 (Utah 2002), illustrates that decisions related to the design and 
safety objectives of a governmental project are considered discretionary functions under 
the Governmental Immunity Act. In Laney, the plaintiffs husband was electrocuted 
when an irrigation pipe that he was carrying came into contact with power lines operated 
by Fairview City. The plaintiff argued that the city was negligent in failing to make the 
lines safe by not raising the power lines, not insulating the power lines, and not providing 
additional warnings. \ 17. Although the plaintiff had challenged specific aspects of the 
government's project, the Court found that because all three of these decisions "touch[] 
the safety of the power lines" they are essential to the realization of the governmental 
objective of public safety. \ 18. Moreover, although the record failed to demonstrate 
which safety factors the city considered in making its decision, the Court concluded that 
this type of decision (one affecting public safety) would necessarily require a basic cost-
benefit analysis and exercise of discretion. If 19. 
In contrast, the cases relied upon by Sandberg involve routine operational 
decisions. For example, Trujillo v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 986 P.2d 752 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999), dealt with the operational decision of where to place hollow plastic barrels 
directing traffic. A general contractor hired by UDOT was contractually responsible for 
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traffic control and was implementing a traffic plan developed by an unlicensed staff 
engineer. Id. at 756. The staff engineer made no attempt to consult industry standards or 
any studies on barriers, and there was no evidence in the record suggesting that the staff 
engineer's decision was subject to any sort of scrutiny or review. Icl 761-762. Based on 
these facts, this Court properly concluded that this type of routine, operational decision 
would not be entitled to discretionary function immunity. Id at 762. 
3. The Design of the Waste Facility Requires the Exercise of Basic 
Policy Evaluation, Judgment and Expertise. 
The design of the Waste Facility also required the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise of the government agency, as demonstrated by the 
numerous steps that both the County and the City took in determining the design of the 
facility and the need to design a new landfill with a private citizens unloading facility. Id. 
Three independent consultants, Chen Northern, Inc., Brown, Vence & Associates and 
Richard Montgomery were hired to test the conditions of the land and to determine 
whether there was a need for a citizens unloading facility, all of which recommended a 
citizens unloading facility. Id. The Public Works Department then took the 
recommendations of the consultants and analyzed it against industry standards such as the 
Sanitary Landfill Manual of Practice prepared by the American Society of Civil 
Engineers. (R. 195-96). 
After evaluating this information, the Public Works Department then determined 
that a citizens unloading station would increase safety, reduce the risk of fire and blowing 
litter, and lessen the potential for leachate generation. (R. 196; 200-09). The Public 
Works Department also based its recommendation in part on the concept's compatibility 
with the local and national emphasis on recycling. Id. The Public Works Department 
then proposed an implementation plan, budget impacts and construction bids. Id. 
Next, the Public Works Department and the Council hired Salt Lake City 
Corporation Engineering Division to design the citizen's unloading station. City 
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Engineering drafted a document outlining the scope of work. (R. 585). In this Scope of 
Work, City Engineering determined that the "proposed design concept consists of a 
central pit located approximately in the center of the parcel with access roads on both 
sides for autos and private trailers." (R. 586). The Scope of Work included an artist's 
rendition of what the overall landfill would look like, including the pit without barriers or 
chains. (R. 593). 
Paul Jara, the design engineer for the project, then began researching landfills by 
visiting landfills around the United States, reviewing other landfill designs and 
researching any applicable industry standards. Mr. Jara researched the right kind of 
concrete to use, the application of a metallic floor at the bottom of the pit, the proper 
height of a pit, the type of equipment to be used in the pit, the slope of the floor on each 
end of the pit for ease of equipment and other design features relating to safety and 
convenience of citizens. Mr. Jara set forth all of his research, calculations and 
conclusions in his Design Report. (R. 632-768). 
The Public Works Department and the Council then requested that Mr. Jara 
prepare preliminary plans. Once these plans were prepared, the City sent the plans to 
EMCON, an independent consulting firm in Waste Management and Environmental 
Control. EMCON reviewed the plans and made minor suggestions and comments for 
changes to the plan. EMCON determined that the plans were within industry standards 
and were safe. 
The City then began sending the plans at various stages of design to other public 
and private entities soliciting comment. These entities included Department of 
Transportation, Streets Division, Public Utilities Department, Parks and Recreation, 
Planning & Zoning, Cable TV, Mountain Fuel, Utah Power & Light, U.S. West, and 
AT&T. These entities gave their comments at various stages of the design process. At 
each stage in the design process, the City held a meeting to discuss the plans and the 
comments made by others and to incorporate such comments if necessary into the plans. 
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Eventually the final plans were approved by all entities, the Public Works Department 
and the Council. 
All of these steps evidence the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and 
expertise of EMCON, an expert in the field of solid waste facilities, the Public Works 
Department, the Council, City engineers as well as other public departments who 
commented on the plans. EMCON believed and continues to believe that the design is 
safe and consistent with industry standards. (R. 136-37). All throughout the design 
making process these entities focused on safety analysis. This is precisely the decision 
making process that the discretionary function exception is designed to protect. 
4. The City and County Possessed the Requisite Constitutional 
Statutory, or Lawful Authority to Design the Waste Facility. 
The City and County had the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority 
to design and constmction the Waste Facility. In 1991, when the Waste Facility opened, 
the Solid Waste Management Act contained in U.C.A. § 19-6-501 et seq. provided that 
the governing body of each public entity may among other things, "provide waste 
management facilities to handle adequately solid waste generated or existing within or 
without its jurisdiction" and "enter into interlocal agreements with other public entities, 
with public agencies. . . to provide for or operate solid waste management facilities." 
The County and City then entered into the Interlocal Cooperation Agreement, under 
which they established the Council. Thus, clearly the City and the County had the 
requisite statutory authority to design and construct the Waste Facility. 
In summary, analysis of the foregoing four factors demonstrates that the City's 
design of the Waste Facility, including the concrete sidewalks and absence of chains or 
barriers, are closely analogous to the design functions of various governmental agencies 
routinely found to be within the discretionary function exception of section 63-30-10(1). 
For example, in Keegan v. Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995), the plaintiffs husband had 
been killed in an automobile accident in which his car "skidded on black ice, climbed the 
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concrete median barrier separating the eastbound and westbound lanes, slid along the top 
of the barrier, and collided with a bridge support pillar." Id. at 619. The Utah 
Department of Transportation moved for summary judgment, "arguing that the decision 
not to raise the concrete median barrier during the surface overlay projects was a 
discretionary act shielded from liability by governmental immunity . . . . " Id. The trial 
court denied that motion, and the Utah Supreme Court reversed after analyzing the four 
factors described above. The Utah Supreme Court held that: 
UDOT's decision not to raise the concrete barrier during the surface 
overlay projects was not an operational decision involving the negligent 
installation or maintenance of a traffic device, but rather involved a policy-
base plan, approved by the FHWA, which resulted from a considered 
weighing of the costs and benefits of certain safety and construction 
policies and which involved the exercise of UDOT's judgment and 
discretion. Accordingly, we hold that the decision not to raise the concrete 
barrier was a discretionary act shielded from liability under section 63-30-
10. 
Id at 626. 
Similarly, in Price v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 14 P.3d 702, 705 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 2000), the plaintiffs' children were killed in a collision with an Amtrak train in 
South Jordan. "Plaintiffs claimed South Jordan negligently installed and maintained the 
passive warning devices at the crossing and negligently failed to upgrade the passive 
warning devices." Id. The trial court granted South Jordan's summary judgment motion 
on the basis of governmental immunity, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. The 
court concluded that "South Jordan exercised basic policy evaluation, judgment, and 
expertise in attempting to provide convenient access while seeking to remedy the safety 
difficulties inherent from railroad tracks mnning through the city." Id. at 710. The court 
further reasoned that "[documentary evidence shows that South Jordan debated a 
number of alternatives for improving traffic safety while considering budgetary and other 
practical restraints." Id. 
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In the precise context of design of landfills, courts from other jurisdictions have 
barred claims based on discretionary immunity. See Lichter v. Paris, 466 N.W.2d 910 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming judgment dismissing complaint where town was immune 
from liability for operation of landfill); Rumbough v. Tampa, 403 So.2d 1139, 1142 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (affirming grant of summary judgment based on discretionary 
immunity afforded to city regarding operation of landfill and stating that "operation [of 
the landfill] is nothing more than an implementation of the decision which was made at 
the planning level" and is entitled to discretionary function immunity). 
In a case on virtually identical to this one, Garrison v. Deschutes County, 986 P.2d 
62, 64 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), the plaintiff fell into a pit at a citizens unloading station. Like 
Sandberg, the plaintiff had been to the station previously. Id. Also like Sandberg, the 
plaintiff backed his pickup truck to the barrier at the edge of the concrete upper slab 
which dropped into a 14.5 foot concrete lower slab, lowered his tailgate, was aware of the 
distance of the drop from the upper and lower slab and then stood in the back of the 
truck, grabbed a lumber rail on the back of the pickup, attempted to swing it out over the 
upper slab, and consequently fell to the lower slab and injured himself. Id. Plaintiff sued 
the county, like Sandberg, as the owner and operator of the landfill. Id. at 63. The trial 
court granted summary judgment on the grounds that the county was entitled to 
governmental immunity. Id. at 66. 
The appellate court affirmed stating that the purpose of governmental immunity is 
"to allow a governmental body to choose between competing policy objectives in the face 
of various risks. Accordingly, as long as the decision-making body has acknowledged 
and assessed the various risks to public safety and has made its decision based on its 
understanding of those risks in light of its objectives, the body cannot be held liable if it 
should turn out that it made the wrong decision." Id. The court then noted that like the 
City engineers in this case, the public works director and the director of solid waste 
operations for the county both said that they considered alternative designs including a 
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fence, railing or other barrier at the end of the upper slab, but determined that such an 
addition would be more of a hazard than a safety feature, in addition to being more costly 
for the county. Id. The court held that such a decision was entitled to immunity despite 
the fact that the plaintiff produced expert testimony as to the unreasonable danger of the 
county's design choice. Id. The court then held: 
That testimony would not go to the question of whether defendant's 
decision took safety into account but, rather, would go to the question of 
the quality of the decision. Again that is precisely what immunity is 
designed to address. If governmental bodies always made perfect choices, 
there would never be a need to invoke immunity. The trial court did not err 
in disregarding the expert testimony, because it would have had no effect 
on the ultimate issue of immunity. Accordingly, the trial court did not err 
when it concluded that, as to plaintiffs first and third specifications of 
negligence, defendant was immune from liability. 
Id 
In this case Bud Stanford has testified that the Public Works Department and the 
Council considered the installation of barriers such as chains and poles during the design 
of the Waste Facility, but decided against such measures because they created a hazard to 
citizens unloading debris and because they might cause other injuries. See Exhibit 3, fl 
15-17. Paul Jara, the City engineer who designed the Waste Facility, testified that he 
considered such measures and decided not to employ such measures. Jara Depo. at 43-45. 
This decision was based in part on EMCON's safety review. EMCON determined that 
the design was a safe design and that often barriers cause more serious injuries than if 
such barriers were not present. Now, Sandberg has filed a suit claiming that the decision 
not to install barriers was wrong, and caused his injury. Just as in Garrison, however, this 
decision is entitled to immunity regardless of whether the decision was right or wrong. 
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C. Even Under Laney, the Application of the Discretionary Function 
Exception to Sandberg's Claim is Constitutional. 
For the reasons just described, Sandberg was and is unable to overcome the 
discretionary immunity bar under the law that existed in 2000 when he claims Lehman, 
Jensen & Donohue acted negligently. In the alternative, Sandberg argued below and in 
this appeal that applying the Governmental Immunity Act to his claim would violate the 
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. This is essentially the same argument the 
Laney court accepted in holding the Governmental Immunity Act "unconstitutional as it 
applies to municipalities operating electrical power systems." 2002 UT 79 at |71 . Even 
if Laney did apply, however, Sandberg's claims still would be barred by governmental 
immunity because the 1987 amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act that Laney 
found unconstitutional did not abrogate a preexisting remedy. Utah courts, including the 
Laney court, have long-recognized that core governmental functions are considered 
outside the scope of the open courts clause. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d at 442; see also 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1236-37 (Utah 1980) (governmental 
immunity applies to actions that are "essential to the core of governmental activity."); 
Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Article I, 
Section 11 is implicated only if a statute denies a person the right to sue the state when 
the state performs a nongovernmental, as opposed to governmental, function."). 
In this case, the City was engaged in a core governmental function because it was 
performing the traditional municipal activity of protecting public health and the 
1
 Although Sandberg does not precisely articulate this argument, presumably he is 
challenging the 1987 amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act, which extends the 
definition of the term "governmental function" to include "any act, failure to act, 
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, 
failure to act, operation, function or undertaking is characterized as governmental, 
proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, or could be performed 
by private enterprise or private persons." U.C.A. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (emphasis added). Prior 
to the 1987 amendment, the term "governmental function" was not defined by the Act 
and was only defined by case law. See Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838843 
(Utah 1990). 
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environment by providing for safe waste disposal. Under Utah law, municipalities and 
other government agencies are charged with significant responsibility regarding waste 
disposal. In particular, Utah's Solid Waste Management Act provides that "the 
governing body of each public entity may ... provide solid waste management facilities 
to handle adequately solid waste generated or existing within or without its jurisdiction" 
and "enter into short or long-term interlocal agreements with other public entities [or] 
public agencies ... to provide for or operate solid waste management facilities." Utah 
Code Ann. §19-6-503(2); §19-6-503(4). In addition, the statute further extends the City's 
authority so that it may "require that all solid waste generated within its jurisdiction be 
delivered to a solid waste management facility" and "control the right to collect, 
transport, and dispose of all solid waste generated within its jurisdiction." Utah Code 
Ann. § 19-6-503(6); §19-6-503(7). 
Sandberg's sole argument on appeal is that the operation of a landfill cannot be 
considered a core governmental function because the activity could be performed by a 
private entity. (Appellant's Brief at 21). Sandberg's characterization of the law is overly 
broad and inapplicable in the present scenario. Indeed, Utah law recognizes that nearly 
"all activities that are quintessentially governmental in nature can also be conducted by 
private agencies, at least to a certain degree." DeBry, 889 P.2d at 442. However, such a 
finding does not indicate that the activity is not governmental in nature. IcL (holding 
regulation of building standards is a governmental function even though private groups 
perform similar activities.). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reached a similar holding in Parks v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 449 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 2002) In Parks, the plaintiff obtained a 
verdict for damages caused in an accident with a public bus, which the court reduced 
pursuant to Governmental Immunity Act's damage cap provision. On appeal, the 
plaintiff argued that the cap violated the open courts clause because UTA was acting in 
proprietary capacity. In support of her position, the plaintiff argued that busing services 
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are traditionally operated by private companies, that UTA produces revenue through its 
operations, and that UTA seeks to make a profit. Id. at *5. Despite the plaintiffs 
arguments, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that UTA was still acting in a 
governmental capacity. Id. at * 10-11. 
Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) is similarly 
instructive. In Wright, the plaintiff sued a public University for injuries she sustained 
when she was struck by a University employee. Although the plaintiff conceded that the 
University was immune party under the 1987 amendments to the Governmental 
Immunity Act, she challenged the statute's constitutionality as violating the open courts 
clause. Id at 387-88. Despite the fact that higher education is routinely available 
through private institutions, this Court concluded that the operation of a public university 
is governmental function, and therefore outside the scope of the open courts clause. Id. at 
388. 
Like public transportation and education, the operation of a public landfill is a 
traditional governmental function that serves the public interest, as recognized by several 
other jurisdictions. In addressing similar facts, a Florida appellate court noted that the 
"efficient operation of a sanitary landfill ... meets a pressing community need and serves 
a laudable public purpose." Rumbough v. Tampa, 403 So.2d 1139, 1141 (Fla Dist. Ct. 
App. 1981) (affirming summary judgment based on discretionary function immunity). 
Similarly, an Oregon appellate court recently noted that decisions regarding the design 
and operation of a landfill involve the weighing of various economic and public safety 
interests. Garrison v. Deschutes County, 986 P.2d 62, 65-67 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) 
(affirming summary judgment on the basis that the county was entitled to immunity in its 
decision to not include barriers around the citizen unloading station). 
These cases are equally applicable in the present situation. In designing and 
operating the Waste Facility, the municipality was acting pursuant to statutory authority 
with the objective of providing for the disposal of public waste in a safe, environmentally 
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sensitive manner. Thus, the City was performing a traditional function of regulating 
public and environmental health. The fact that private businesses may also provide 
landfill services does not strip the City of its traditional governmental function, and its 
decision should be afforded immunity. 
D. The City Had No Duty To Mop the Sidewalk Dry. 
Even if this Court concludes that the Governmental Immunity Act does not apply 
or that application of the statute would be unconstitutional, this Court may still affirm the 
trial court's entry of summary judgment on the ground that Salt Lake City did not have a 
duty to prevent what Sandberg claims was the cause of his fall - a wet or icy sidewalk. 
Although the trial court did not base its summary judgment ruling on this alternative 
issue, it is well-established that an appellate court "may affirm a grant of summary 
judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below." 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Indeed, numerous Utah 
cases have held governmental activities non-actionable on the ground that the 
governmental agency did not owe a duty of care to the injured party, without relying on 
the Governmental Immunity Act. See DeBry v. Nobel 889 P.2d 428, 441 n.12 (citing 
Madsen v. Borthick, 850 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1993); C.T. v. Marinez, 845 P.2d 246, 247-
48 (Utah 1992); Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)). 
Although the trial court in this case granted summary judgment based on the 
discretionary function exception, summary judgment could have also been granted on the 
issue of duty. For the City to be liable as an owner or operator of property, Sandberg 
would have to prove that a wet sidewalk is a dangerous condition that the City was 
responsible for preventing. Utah courts, however, have long "held that property owners 
are not insurers of the safety of those who come upon their property, even though they 
are business invitees." Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). 
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Sandberg claims his fall was caused by the wet and slippery sidewalk.2 (R. 846). 
To this extent, Sandberg's claim is virtually identical to the plaintiffs claim in Martin, 
where the plaintiff slipped and fell "on a sidewalk leading from the parking lot of 
Safeway Stores to the main entrance of its grocery store." 565 P.2d at 1140. The 
evidence showed that "it had been snowing intermittently throughout the day" the 
plaintiff apparently fell on "an icy spot about twelve to fourteen inches in diameter." Id. 
The trial court granted a directed verdict and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning 
that "[i]t is not the duty of persons in control of such buildings to mop the sidewalk dry or 
take other steps necessary to prevent the accumulation of moisture on the sidewalk that 
might freeze and create an icy condition." Id. at 1141. The court further emphasized that 
"it cannot be the duty of persons in control of such buildings to seek out and mop dry all 
such depressions in the walkways and approaches to such buildings." Id. 
Like the defendant in Martin, the City, as owner or operator of the Waste Facility, 
had no duty as a matter of law to "mop the sidewalk dry or take other steps necessary to 
prevent the accumulation of moisture on the sidewalk that might freeze." Id. Because 
Sandberg contends the wet concrete caused the fall, summary judgment may be affirmed 
on the ground that the City owed no duty of care. 
CONCLUSION 
Sandberg did not and cannot prove that he would have prevailed against and 
recovered from the City, and therefore the trial court properly found the legal malpractice 
element of proximate cause fatally lacking. Under the law that existed at the time of the 
allegedly negligent decision not to sue the City, the allegedly negligent design of the 
2
 Sandberg admits that he was familiar with the layout and design of the pit, having 
visited on several prior occasions. He also admits that he saw the warning signs around 
the pit and that he was aware of the dangers of falling into the pit. (R. 140, 842-44). 
Thus, Sandberg's claim is limited to an action for failure to maintain, as he has never 
argued that the City breached any duty to warn. 
30 
Waste Facility was protected by discretionary governmental function immunity. 
Moreover, even if this Court concludes that the Governmental Immunity Act does not 
apply or that application of the statute would be unconstitutional, this Court still should 
affirm summary judgment on the ground that the City had no duty to prevent the admitted 
cause of Sandberg's accident by removing any snow or rain that had accumulated on the 
sidewalk. Because Sandberg could not have been successful in a suit against the City, he 
cannot prevail in a legal malpractice action as a matter of law. As such, summary 
judgment in favor of defendant Lehman, Jensen, & Donahue should be affirmed. 
DATED this 7 ^ day of October, 2002. 
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